Volume 87

Issue 2

Article 20

January 1985

Public Officials
Charles O. Lorenson
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles O. Lorenson, Public Officials, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. (1985).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/20

This Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1984 is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU
College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review
by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Lorenson: Public Officials

PUBLIC OFFICIALS
I.

CANDIDATE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS

White v. Manchin, 318 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1984).

In a consolidated action, White v. Manchin,' the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals interpreted the West Virginia constitutional residency requirements to
determine whether the respondents, two state senatorial candidates certified to run
in the Democratic primary, were proper "residents" of the senatorial districts and

the counties which they sought to represent. Finding that the respondents did not
meet the election residency requirements, since one respondent was not a resident
of the proper district and the other respondent did not reside in the proper county,
the court granted writs of mandamus. These writs compelled the Secretary of State

to withdraw the respondents' candidate certifications and commanded certain county
ballot commissioners to strike or omit the candidates' names from the official ballots

used in a primary election. 2
Initially, the court held that it was proper to file the special election mandamrnus
action directly with the supreme court. 3 Also, the Secretary of State, county ballot
commissioners in the senatorial districts affected, and the candidates themselves
were proper parties to the action."
Next, the court analyzed whether the individual candidates met the residency
requirements of West Virginia Constitution article VI, section 12. This article provides that "[n]o person shall be a senator . . . who has not for one year next

preceding his election, been a resident of the district or county from which he is
elected." The court established that, for the purposes of state election law, "resident" is synonymous with "domicile" and "domicile" has two elements-presence
and an intention of remaining.'
The petitioners alleged, and supported with affidavits, that candidate Joe Manchin III, was not a resident of the fourteenth senatorial district as defined by West
Virginia Code section 1-2-1.16 Manchin admitted that he, his wife and his children
occupied a dwelling in Whitehall, which was changed from the fourteenth to the
thirteenth senatorial district7 by the Senate Redistricting Act of 1982.8 Manchin
' White v. Manchin, 318 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1984). Justices Harshbarger and Neely did not
participate. Chief Justice Caplan (retired) was recalled and participated in this case.
2 Id. at 491.

Id. at 476 (citing syllabus point five in State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W. Va. 513,
223 S.E.2d 607, appealdismissed sub nom., Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976)). Additionally,
W. VA. CODE § 3-1-45 (1979) provides in part: "A mandamus shall lie from the supreme court of

appeals to compel any official herein to do and perform legally any duty herein required to him,"
4

White, 318 S.E.2d at 476.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 474-75. W. VA. CODE § 1-2-1(d)(13) (Supp. 1984) defines the area encompassing the

13th senatorial district. W. VA. CODE § 1-2-1(d)(14) (Supp. 1984) defines the area encompassing the
14th senatorial district.
' White, 318 S.E.2d at 483.

* W. VA. CODE § 1-2-1 (Supp. 1984).
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argued that he grew up and went to school in areas still in the fourteenth senatorial
district. 9 Also, upon learning that his dwelling was not within the fourteenth
senatorial district, Manchin changed the address on his voter registration to a post
office box within the fourteenth senatorial district.' The court noted that Manchin
had "substantial economic, cultural, and civic ties . . . in the 14th Senatorial

District."" However, the court held that Manchin failed to meet the physical
presence element of "domicile" and therefore was not a resident of the fourteenth
senatorial district.' 2
The second election mandamus action involved the application of West Virginia
Constitution article VI, section 4, which provides that "[e]very district shall elect two
senators, but, where the district is composed of more than one county, both shall
not be chosen from the same county." The fifth senatorial district is composed
of portions of Cabell and Wayne Counties.' The senatorial seat not being con-4
tested in the election at issue was already occupied by a resident of Cabell County.'
Charles M. Polan, Jr. filed as a fifth senatorial district candidate from Wayne
County, but the petitioners contended that he was not a resident of that county.' 5
Despite the fact that fixing the domicile of a single man may be difficult, the court
agreed with the petitioners that Polan was not a resident of Wayne County. " Polan
introduced several photographs showing his "sleeping quarters" in an office building
located in an industrial area of Wayne County.'I The Polan Realty Company owned
eighty percent of that office building, which the court described as commercial
and industrial in nature."I However, contrary evidence showed that Polan continued
to maintain and sleep in an apartment in The Prichard Building, which was an
office building in Cabell County also owned by the Polan Realty Company.' The
court noted that Polan had lived in "The Prichard" for a longer duration than
in the "sleeping quarters" and that the accommodations at "The Prichard" more
resembled those of a residency.20 The court concluded that Polan was neither present in Wayne County nor did he intend to remain as a resident of Wayne County. 2'
White, 318 S.E.2d at 483.
Id. The court added in n.6 that Manchin does not "reside" at his post office box and is
not properly registered to vote.
Id.
Id. at 484.
" See W. VA. CODE § 1-2-1(2)(d)(5) (Supp. 1983).
,4White, 318 S.E.2d at 476.
"

Is Id.
16 Id. at 486. The court quoted from Shaw v. Shaw, 155 W. Va. 712, 716, 187 S.E.2d 124, 127
(1972): "The important facts in determining the domicile of a person who has more than one residence
are the physical character of each, the time spent and the things done in each place, and whether or
not there is an intention to return to the original domicile."
,7 White, 318 S.E.2d at 484.
" Id. Polan was the vice president and general manager of the Polan Realty Company.

9 Id.
20 Id.
21

Id.

at 486.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/20

2

Lorenson: Public Officials
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Finally, the court addressed a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge
to the constitutionality of the residency requirement under West Virginia Constitution article VI, section 12.22 The court distinguished state constitutional and statutory
durational residency requirements from local ordinances which require a certain
duration of residency before becoming eligible to be a local candidate.23 The court
held "that the one year durational residency requirement for state senators found
in West Virginia Constitution article VI, section 12 serves a compelling state interest
and does not violate the fundamental constitutional rights of either candidates or
voters," 2 whereas durational residency requirements for local political office are
invalid and do not serve a compelling state interest. Since neither respondent could
be considered a proper "resident" for one year prior to the election, they were
both declared ineligible to be elected from the districts they sought to represent
or to hold the offices for which they filed. 5
II.

REMOVAL oF PuBmc OcICIALS

Powers v. Goodwin, No. 16291 (W. Va. July 13, 1984).
George v. Godby, No. 16138 (W. Va. July 12, 1984).
The state's highest tribunal affirmed one lower court's removal of two county
commissioners and reversed another lower court's decision to dismiss a removal
claim. In these cases, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reiterated
that, in a removal action under West Virginia Code section 6-6-7,26 grounds for
27
removal of public officials must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
The two county commissioners removed from office by the circuit court in
Powers v. Goodwin,2 8 Cooke and Armstrong, had voted to reimburse $14,547.64
in legal fees incurred by a third county commissioner, Goodwin. Goodwin was

22

Id. at 486-91. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 12 states:

No person shall be a senator or delegate who has not for one year preceding his election,
been a resident within the district or county from which he is elected; and if a senator or
delegate remove from the district or company for which he was elected, his seat shall be
thereby vacated.
23 White, 318 S.E.2d at 488-89.
2I Id. at 488-91 (citing Mara v. Zink, 163 W. Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979)).
2s Id.
26 W. VA. CODE § 6-6-7 (1979) defines the procedure and grounds required to remove county,
district, and municipal officers having fixed terms. Such officers may be removed for causes stated
by W. VA. CODE § 6-6-5 (1979), which include "official misconduct, malfeasance in office, incompetence,
neglect of duty, or gross immorality" as grounds for removal. Under § 6-6-7, five or more voters may
bring the removal action against an official through written charges. After a summons and a copy
of the charges are served upon the official, "[t]he court . . . shall, without a jury, hear the charges
and all evidence offered in support thereof, or in opposition thereto, and upon satisfactory proof of
the charges shall remove any such officer or person from office. . . ." W. VA. CODE § 6-6-7 (1979).
2 The clear and convincing evidence standard was set forth in Evans v. Huchinson, 158 W.Va.
359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975) (syllabus point nine).
28 Powers v. Goodwin, No. 16291 (W. Va. July 13, 1984).
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subject to criminal charges and a removal charge arising out of alleged misuse of
the county's telephone credit card. 29 Before Cooke and Armstrong voted to pay
the legal fees, they sought advice from the county's assistant prosecutor.3" In an
earlier appeal arising from the same removal proceeding, the state's high court said
that the advice from the assistant prosecutor was erroneous . 3 The payment of legal
fees to defend the charges against Goodwin, which were unrelated to the discharge
of Goodwin's official duties, were unauthorized. 32 The petitioners, as taxpayers,
brought the removal proceedings under West Virginia Code sections 6-6-7 and
11-8-3 1.3
In an opinion written by Justice Miller, the majority initially held that allegations in a removal action brought under section 11-8-31 must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. 3 Addressing the facts of Powers, the majority affirmed
the lower court's removal of Cooke and Armstrong, finding that the record
established by clear and convincing evidence that the commissioners acted negligently
5
by failing to independently investigate whether the expenditure was authorized.
Further, the court held that 36
reliance on the advice of counsel was not a per se
defense to a removal action.
In George v. Godby,37 the lower court 3 dismissed a complaint filed against
Godby, the Logan County assessor. The complaint raised issues relating to: (1)
certain loans from the Rich Creek Mining Company to Godby which were not repaid,
(2) the assessor's determination that the tax tickets of certain corporate taxpayers,
including Rich Creek, were "improper," (3) the process by which Godby "impropered" the tax tickets, (4) the competency of Godby's deputy assessors, and
(5) the assessed values of property in Logan County by Godby.3 9 The West Virginia
Supreme Court initially held that it would reverse the lower court's decision to
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 5-6.
" Powers v. Goodwin, 291 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
32 Id. at 477.
" Powers, No. 16291, slip op. at 2-3. W. VA. CODE § 11-8-31 (1983) provides in part:
The State, a taxpayer, or the tax commissioner may institute and prosecute to final judgment
any proceeding for the removal of a member of a local fiscal body who has wilfully or negligently violated any of the provisions of this article.
Upon the petition of the State, a taxpayer, or the tax commissioner, the court or in
vacation the judge, shall set a time for hearing the petition. An attested copy of the petition
and the charges contained therein shall be served upon the defendants at least twenty days
prior to the date of hearing. No other pleading or notice or the proceedings shall be necessary.
See note 26 for a discussion of W. VA. CODE § 6-6-7 (1979).
Id. at 3.
" Id. at 5.
36 Id. at 9.
: George v. Godby, No. 16138 (XV. Va. July 12, 1984).
3' The presiding judges of the Seventh Judicial Circuit disqualified themselves so the Supreme
Court of Appeals assigned the Honorable Arthur M. Recht to the case. Id. at 1.
11Id. at 1-2.
'9
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dismiss the removal claim only if that decision was "against the preponderance
of the evidence, not supported by the evidence, or plainly wrong." 4
Godby, while Logan County assessor, entered into a loan agreement with Rich
Creek Mining Company, with the collateral being certain stock and a deed of trust
on certain real estate owned by Godby.4' Godby never repaid the loan, and he
sold the stock without prior notice to Rich Creek. 2 In 1980 and 1982, Rich Creek
sought repayment of the loan.4 3 In the tax year 1982, certain personal property
tax tickets for Rich Creek and other companies associated with Rich Creek were
marked "To be Improper-J. T. Godby, Assessor," or "Improper Charge, J.T.
Godby, Assessor." 4 Godby testified that he had marked4 personal property tax
tickets "improper" in a similar manner for many years. 1
The high court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice McHugh, discussed case
law interpreting what type of official misconduct warrants removal of public officials
from office under West Virginia Code sections 6-6-5 and 6-6-7.4 6 The court noted
that the procedure followed by Godby to alter tax tickets was not authorized by
the code, since alternation of tax tickets requires action by the county
commissioner.4 7 The lower court had ruled that there was no clear and convincing
evidence that Godby's actions resulted in a waste of public funds, and therefore,
Godby's failure to follow correct procedures did not constitute grounds for removal
from office.48 However, the supreme court noted that a waste of public funds is
merely a factor to be considered and not an absolute requirement in a removal
proceeding.49 "This Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondent [Godby]
concerning the 'impropering' of personal property tax tickets in question constitutes
the type of 'official misconduct, malfeasance in office,' etc., contemplated by the
removal statutes ..

.-s0 The court concluded that "[t]he evidence reveal[ed] an

inappropriate mixture of" Godby's financial obligations and his failure to follow
the proper procedure to alter tax tickets.' Therefore, the court could "justify no
other conclusion but removal" of Godby from office. 2
40 Id. at 12 (quoting Smith v. Godby, 154 W.Va. 190, 174 S.E.2d 165 (1970) (syllabus point
four) (an earlier removal action against the same assessor whereby the lower court removed Godby
from office and the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed).
41 Godby, No. 16138, slip op. at 2.
42

Id. at 2-3.

Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 4-5.

4I

11 Id. at 6-7.
46 Id. at 12-16.
"

Id. at 17. W. VA.

CODE

§ 11-3-27 (1983) sets forth the requirements by which tax tickets may

be altered.
41 Id. at 18-19.
41 Id. at 19.

Id. at 18.
I0
s'Id.
52 Id. at 19.
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III.
In
In
In
In
In

SUSPENSION AND REPRIMAND OF MAGISTRATES

re Pauley, 314 S.E.2d 391 (W. Va. 1983).
re Harshbarger, 314 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1984).
re Osburn, 315 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1984).
re Pauley, 318 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1984).
re Greene, 317 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1984).

In five cases decided during this survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals independently evaluated factual records developed by the Judicial Hearing
Board and the Board's recommendations regarding complaints filed against
magistrates.5 3 For convenience, the earlier decision of In re Pauley" will be referred
to as Pauley I and the later decision 5 5 will be referred to as Pauley IL
Pauley I emphasized that allegations of complaints in judicial disciplinary proceedings "must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." 56 Before making an
independent evaluation of the record and recommendations of the Judicial Hearing Board concerning the complaint against Magistrate Pauley, the majority took
notice of the "political imbroglio" between the Sheriff's Department and Pauley."
The record, as adduced by the Judicial Hearing Board, showed that a bondsperson
appeared before Magistrate Pauley, who was presiding over night court, to post
bond for an incarcerated defendant, James Trent.5 Pauley prepared a release and
sent the bailiff, a sheriff's deputy, to obtain the release of Trent." The deputy
failed to obtain release of Trent because jail persohnel informed the bailiff that
there was a "hold" on Trent at the jail.6"
Pauley's behavior after the bailiff's return without Trent was the subject of
the complaint. Four witnesses testified that Pauley was abusive or at least rude
to the deputy." Three of those witnesses recalled that the magistrate used the word
"shit" at least once. 62 The other two witnesses, Pauley and his secretary, testified
63
that Pauley did not abuse the bailiff verbally and did not say anything profane.
The sheriff subsequently filed a complaint with the Judicial Investigation

SS

See West Virginia Judicial Inquiry Commission v. Dostert, 271 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1980) (syllabus

point one).
In re Pauley, 314 S.E.2d 391 (,V. Va. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Pauley I].
In re Pauley, 318 S.E.2d 418 (,V. Va. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Pauley II].
'o Pauley I, 314 S.E,2d at 399. The "clear and convincing evidence" rule is taken directly from
Rule III(C)(2) of the WEST VmGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST
JUSTICES, JUDGES, AND MAGISTRATES (Supp. 1984).
" Id. at 392.
" Id. at 393.
"
"

s Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 400 (Miller, J., dissenting).
62 Id.
63

Id.
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Commission 6 alleging violations of Canons 2(A), 65 3(A)(2), 66 and 3(A)(3)6 " of the
Judicial Code of Ethics.
Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, the majority, through
Justice McGraw, dismissed the complaint and rejected the Judicial Hearing Board's
recommendation that the magistrate be publicly censured. 68 The court found
"substantial conflict in [the] testimony."" Also, the court stressed that the bailiff
failed to properly discharge his duties, making Pauley's frustration understandable."
Furthermore, the majority characterized the word "shit" as vulgar, rather than
adopting the Board's characterization of the word as being profane. 7 "The
mischaracterization of the word in question undermines the conclusions of fact
and law with which we are presented, as well as the ultimate recommendation.""2
Justice Miller, in a dissenting opinion, found it "incredible" that the majority
characterized the evidence as close, finding that the record "clearly reveals abusive
conduct toward" the bailiff.73 The dissent also questioned the majority's treatment
of the vulgarities allegedly uttered by Pauley.74
In another decision involving magistrates' conduct, the court in a per curiam
opinion, concurred with the Judicial Hearing Board's recommendation that
Magistrate Ward Harshbarger be publicly censured for neglecting his duties." As
a result of an agreement to work for another magistrate, Magistrate Harshbarger
was on duty as night court magistrate for a thirteen-hour shift ending at 8:00 a.m. 7'
At 6:45 a.m., a security person for the Charleston Area Medical Center attempted
to locate a magistrate in order to obtain an emergency mental hygiene commitment
for a patient to be transported to Spencer State Hospital.7 7 Harshbarger testified
that he went home at 6:30 and did not return to work, but he notified the sheriff's
department as to where he could be reached. 78 An official of the Charleston Area
6, The Judicial Investigation Commission receives, investigates, and initiates complaints against
justices, judges, and magistrates. Rule II of the WEST VIRGINIA RuLES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE HANDLING OF CoMPLAwITs AGAINST JUSTICES, JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES (Supp.

1984).

ETmcs (1981) provides:
"A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
65

Canon 2(A) of the JUrDICIAL

66

Canon 3(A)(2) of the

CODE OF

JtDICIAL CODE

OF ETiucs (1981) provides:

"A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him."
" Canon 3(A)(3) of the JUDICIAL
and courteous."
65 Pauley I, 314 S.E.2d at 400.
69 Id. at 394.
7oId.

CODE

OF ETcs requires a judge to "be patient, dignified,

at 395.

Id. at 394.
72
"

"
"

Id.

at 394-95.

Id. at 400 (Miller, J., dissenting).
Id. at 400-01.
In re Harshbarger, 314 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1984).

76 Id.
77 Id.

at 80.
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Medical Center complained to the assistant administrative director of the magistrate

court system."9
Stressing the importance of magistrate availability, the court found that
Harshbarger violated a judicial order requiring that magistrate hold night court
in Kanawha County.8" In so holding, the court rejected the magistrate's contention
that this order did not require him to be physically present at all times in magistrate

court.II
In In re Osburn, 2 the court, in a per curiam opinion, again concurred with
the Judicial Hearing Board and issued a public reprimand of a magistrate. Magistrate
Osburn was on duty at the time a criminal defendant was brought to the magistrate's
office, but Osburn was at home and did not have the prisoner personally brought
before him for a hearing.8 3 The magistrate testified that, in a telephone conversation with the defendant, he informed the prisoner of his rights.8 4 The defendant
read and signed a "rights sheet" to which the magistrate's assistant rubber stamped
the magistrate's signature.85 The court held that, by failing to attend the arraignment, the magistrate violated Canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics, which
requires that "[jiudicial duties of a judge takes precedence over all his other
activities." 6
The majority, in Pauley II,87 adopted the Board's recommendation that
Magistrate Kermit Pauley be suspended for six months. A defendant, Alfred
Jackson, was arrested without a warrant for an attempted burglary and subsequently
brought before Pauley, who decided that an arrest warrant should issue.8 8 However,
"the arrest warrant was not completed at the time that the defendant was committed to the jail" because no secretarial assistance had arrived that morning.19
Also, Pauley did not inform Jackson in plain terms of the nature of the complaint
against him, of his right to counsel, of his right to remain silent, or of his right
to a preliminary hearing.8 0 The magistrat contended that he failed to inform
Jackson was uncooperative. 1 Jackson comthe defendant of his rights 9because
2
mitted suicide while in jail.
The majority adopted the Board's recommendation that Magistrate Pauley be
79

Id.

80

Id. at 81-82.

s Id. at 81.
"

In re Osburn, 315 S.E.2d 640 (NV. Va. 1984).

"

Id. at 642.

84 Id.
"5
06

Id.

Id. at 643.
, Pauley II, 318 S.E.2d 418 (-V. Va. 1984).
" Id. at 420.
99Id.

11 Id. at 421.
91 Id.
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suspended for six months without pay, concluding that "Pauley committed Jackson
to jail without completing the proper intake papers, resulting in a failure to afford
him counsel and a prompt disposition of the charge,"" and, that by clear and
convincing evidence, the magistrate violated the Judicial Code of Ethics."
Justice Neely dissented arguing that Pauley was made a "scapegoat for an
egregious, systemic institutional failure.""g Neely stressed that, though the behavior
of Pauley was "negligent" and the handling of the paperwork was "incompetent,"
the magistrate's behavior did not cause the prisoner's suicide. 9' It is implicit in
Justice Neely's dissent that the six month sanction should not have issued."
Finally, in In re Greene,98 the state's highest court dismissed a complaint against
a magistrate who failed to make a criminal complaint form available to persons
upon their request. Douglas and Harlan Dotson were involved in an altercation
with Raymond and Linda Thomas after which the Thomases called Magistrate
Greene seeking to file complaints. 9 After that call, Douglas Dotson also requested
to filed complaint forms for warrants against the Thomases, but Greene told Dotson that he would take no further action until he could review the Thomases'
complaints.'0 0 Based on the Thomases' complaints, Greene issued warrants for arrest
of the Dotsons.' ° ' Later, Greene's clerk told the Dotsons that no warrant would
be issued because of a policy against the granting of cross-warrants. 02 Cross-warrants
are "warrants issued as a matter of revenge or spite in order to compel the other
party to perhaps dismiss a warrant that might otherwise have merit." 0 3 This policy
was the result of Chief Circuit Judge Jerry Cook's verbal instruction informing
both Boone County magistrates to refrain from issuing such cross-warrants. 04
The appeals court found that Greene relied in good faith on this instruction,
though "Judge Cook had no lawful authority to issue such a rule."'' 0 Therefore,
even though Greene erred in not supplying complaint forms to the Dotsons, he
did not intend to prejudice the rights
of the Dotsons and did not violate Canon
0
3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics.1 6
Charles 0. Lorensen
11Id. at
14 Id.
at
IId. at
96 Id. at

422.
421-22.
422 (Neely, J., dissenting).

422-23.

91Id. at 422.
"1 In re Greene, 317 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1984).
19Id. at 170.
10 Id.
Id.
102Id.

Id. at 170-71.
101Id. at 171.
"0'

1°s
Id.
106 Id.
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